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CALIFORNIA: EVALUATING THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TEACHER 
TENURE IN ALASKA 
M. Rebecca Cooper∗ 
ABSTRACT 
In the summer of 2013, California's teacher tenure statutes were found to 
violate the equal protection clause of the state's Constitution. The statutes 
called for tenure to be granted after two years of teaching, contained 
significant due process protections in case of dismissal, and required that new 
hires be laid off before teachers with tenure. The group that brought the 
lawsuit, Students Matter, is considering filing lawsuits in other states. This 
Note examines Alaska's tenure statutes to assess the state's vulnerability to a 
copycat lawsuit. While most of Alaska's tenure statutes seem safe from 
challenge, the state should evaluate its tenure system to determine if it is 
leading to the best outcome for students. 
INTRODUCTION 
In June of 2013, Judge Rolf M. Treu of the Superior Court of 
California in Los Angeles County sent shock waves across the education 
landscape when he handed down his decision in Vergara v. California,1 
finding that the state’s teacher tenure statutes violated the equal 
protection clause of the Constitution of California. The New York Times 
described the decision as “one that could radically alter how California 
teachers are hired and fired and prompt challenges to tenure laws in 
other states.”2 The San Francisco Chronicle asked “[i]s this the end of 
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 1. No. BC484642, 2014 WL 2598719, at *7 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 10, 2014). 
 2. Jennifer Medina, Judge Rejects Teacher Tenure for California, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/11/us/california-teacher-
tenure-laws-ruled-unconstitutional.html?_r=1.  
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teacher tenure in California?”3 
Although Education Secretary Arne Duncan enthusiastically 
supported the outcome of the case by saying that all students in 
California and in the rest of the United States should have the “equal 
opportunity to be taught by a great teacher,”4 teachers unions have 
condemned the decision.5 The National Education Association 
denounced the lawsuit as “never [being] about helping students, but [as] 
yet another attempt by millionaires and corporate special interests to 
undermine the teaching profession and push their own ideological 
agenda on public schools and students while working to privatize 
public education.”6 Calling the day the decision was handed down “a 
sad day for public education,” the American Federation of Teachers 
claimed that the Vergara decision “pitt[ed] students against their 
teachers.”7 Joshua Pechthalt, the president of the California Federation 
of Teachers, stated that “the judge fell victim to the anti-union, anti-
teacher rhetoric and one of America’s finest corporate law firms that set 
out to scapegoat teachers for the real problems that exist in public 
education.”8 
The effects of the Vergara decision do not stop at the California 
border. Students Matter, the well-heeled organization that brought the 
lawsuit, is “considering filing lawsuits in New York, Connecticut, 
Maryland, Oregon, New Mexico, Idaho and Kansas as well as other 
states with powerful unions where legislatures have defeated attempts 
to change teacher tenure laws.”9 Within months, two lawsuits, later 
consolidated, were filed in New York challenging the state’s tenure 
 
 3.  Nanette Asimov, Bob Egelko & Melody Gutierrez, Is This the End of 
Teacher Tenure in California?, S.F. CHRONICLE (June 11, 2014), 
http://www.sfgate.com/education/article/Is-this-the-end-of-teacher-tenure-in-
California-5542577.php.  
 4. Statement from U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan Regarding the 
Decision in Vergara v. California, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (June 10, 2014), 
http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/statement-us-secretary-education-
arne-duncan-regarding-decision-vergara-v-califo.  
 5. See Statement from AFT President Weingarten on Vergara Decision, AM. 
FED’N OF TEACHERS  (June 10, 2014), http://www.aft.org/press-
release/statement-aft-president-weingarten-vergara-decision [hereinafter AFT 
President] (calling the decision a sad day for public education); NEA President: 
California Ruling Allows Corporate Interests to Trump Students' Needs, NAT’L EDUC. 
ASS’N (June 10, 2014), http://www.nea.org/home/59351.htm [hereinafter NEA 
President] (claiming that the ruling hurts students and undermines school 
districts’ recruitment and retention efforts of highly qualified teachers). 
 6. NEA President, supra note 5.  
 7. AFT President, supra note 5.  
 8. Medina, supra note 2. 
 9. Id. 
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laws.10 
In the wake of the Vergara decision, all states that have teacher 
tenure laws should examine their policies to see if they are in danger of 
similar litigation. As Alaska has tenure statutes, a detailed comparison 
and analysis needs to be conducted to determine if Alaska’s policies are 
vulnerable to a similar lawsuit, and the likelihood of success of such 
legal action. 
The Alaska Legislature has already begun evaluating its teacher 
tenure laws. During the 2013–14 legislative session, the legislature 
considered in House Bill 278 extending the requirement for tenure from 
three years of teaching in a district to five years in urban areas, while 
keeping the requirement at three years in rural districts.11 However, this 
provision died in the Senate12 because the conference committee “found 
that three years for tenure is the norm for school districts in other 
states.”13 The final version of House Bill 278 that was signed into law 
instead compelled the Department of Administration to evaluate and 
make recommendations regarding teacher tenure by June 15, 2015.14 The 
Department of Administration partnered with the Center for Alaska 
Education Policy Research (CAEPR) at the University of Alaska 
Anchorage to “explor[e] the purpose and value of tenure, alternatives to 
the current structure in Alaska, and the value of tenure to teachers 
including how it affects the teacher labor market.”15 Yet, according to the 
Department of Administration’s website, this report has been delayed 
due to “some unexpected challenges related to the technical and original 
requirements of the project,” and has not yet been released.16 
 
 10. Blake Neff, NY Tenure Lawsuit Wracked By Feuding Parties, THE DAILY 
CALLER (Sept. 13, 2014), http://dailycaller.com/2014/09/13/ny-tenure-lawsuit-
wracked-by-feuding-parties/. 
 11. H.B. 278, 28th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., at §§ 25–26 (Alaska 2013), available at 
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_bill_text.asp?hsid=HB0278C&session=2
8.  
 12. S.B. 278, 28th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess., at §§ 25–26 (Alaska 2013), available at 
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_bill_text.asp?hsid=HB0278E&session=2
8.  
 13. Tim Bradner, Compromise Splits School Funding Increase, ALASKA JOURNAL 
OF COMMERCE (May 14, 2014), http://www.alaskajournal.com/Alaska-Journal-
of-Commerce/May-Issue-3-2014/Compromise-splits-school-funding-increase/ 
(quoting Senator Kevin Meyer, R-Anchorage).  
 14. H.B. 278, supra note 11, at §§ 25–26.  
 15. Ctr. for Alaska Educ. Policy Research, Salary and Benefits Schedule and 
Teacher Tenure Study, UNIV. OF ALASKA ANCHORAGE 2 (Dec. 2, 2014), 
http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/CAEPR/home/docs/2014_12AASB2014HB27
8Presentation.pdf. 
 16. Salary and Benefits Schedule for School Districts, PERSONNEL AND LABOR 
RELATIONS, ALASKA DEP’T OF ADMIN. (2015), http://doa.alaska.gov/dop/ 
HB278SchoolStudy/. 
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While the State of California is appealing the Vergara decision,17 
Alaska should not wait for the final outcome of the appeal to examine its 
own approaches to teacher hiring and firing. A challenge to Alaska’s 
tenure laws may face an uphill battle, as differences in California’s and 
Alaska’s jurisprudence and statutes could limit the probability of a 
potential lawsuit’s success. Nevertheless, the Alaska State Legislature 
should reexamine its tenure laws to ensure that they will lead to the 
most positive outcomes for students. 
I. THE VERGARA DECISION 
The plaintiffs in Vergara, nine students from across the state,18 
challenged five California statutes relating to teacher tenure19: the 
California Education Code §§ 44929.21(b) (“Permanent Employment 
Statute”),20 44934,21 44938(b)(1) and (2),22 44944 (“Dismissal Statutes”),23 
and 44955 (“Last-In-First-Out (LIFO)”).24 
The Permanent Employment Statute states that districts can grant 
tenure to teachers who have taught in the district for “two complete 
consecutive school years,” with notice of the decision given to the 
employee by March 15th of the second year.25 
The Dismissal Statutes lay out the due process procedures in place 
in case of dismissal of a teacher with tenure.26 Section 44934 requires 
districts to file written charges stating cause for the dismissal to the 
governing board, which then, upon majority vote, gives the teacher 
thirty days’ notice of the decision, unless the employee demands a 
hearing.27 The governing board may not act on charges of unsatisfactory 
performance unless the board or an authorized representative gave 
written notice of the unsatisfactory performance, with specific instances 
and particularity at least ninety calendar days before the date of filing, 
so that the employee has “an opportunity to correct his or her faults and 
 
 17. Adam Nagourney, California Governor Appeals Court Ruling Overturning 
Protections for Teachers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/08/31/us/california-governor-fights-decision-on-teacher-tenure.html. 
 18. Meet the Plaintiffs, STUDENTS MATTER (Jan. 23, 2014, 7:51 AM), 
http://studentsmatter.org/meet-the-plaintiffs. 
 19. Vergara v. California, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 2598719, at *2 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. June 10, 2014). 
 20. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44929.21(b) (West 2012).  
 21. Id. § 44934. 
 22. Id. §§ 44938(b)(1)–(2). 
 23. Id. § 44944. 
 24. Id. § 44955. 
 25. Id. § 44929.21(b). 
 26. Id. §§ 44934, 44938(b)(1)–(2), 44944.  
 27. Id. § 44934. 
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overcome the grounds for the charge.”28 If the employee requests a 
hearing, it must begin within sixty days of the employee’s demand and 
will be conducted by a Commission on Professional Competence.29 Both 
the governing board and the employee can be represented by counsel, 
and may conduct discovery and depositions. The final decision of the 
Commission on Professional Competence can be appealed through the 
court system.30 
In the case of a staff reduction, the LIFO statute specifies that “the 
services of no permanent employee may be terminated . . . while any 
probationary employee, or any other employee with less seniority, is 
retained to render a service which said permanent employee is 
certificated and competent to render,” and employees are “terminated in 
the inverse of the order in which they were employed.”31 
The Plaintiffs in Vergara challenged these tenure statutes 
(collectively, “Challenged Statutes”) under the California Constitution’s 
equal protection clause.32 Article 1, section 7(a) of the California 
Constitution reads that “[a] person may not be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law or denied equal protection of the 
laws.”33 The California Supreme Court has determined that this section 
is “substantially the equivalent of the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”34 For that 
reason, the California courts analyze state equal protection claims using 
the same tiered levels of scrutiny as the federal courts.35 In cases 
involving economic regulation, challenged statutes are presumed 
constitutional, and the distinctions must “bear some rational 
relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose.”36 Statutes that 
involve “suspect classifications” or that touch on “fundamental 
interests” must survive strict scrutiny, where the state has the burden of 
establishing that there is a compelling interest for the law and that the 
distinctions are necessary to further its purpose.37 
The education provisions of the California Constitution were also 
relevant to the Vergara decision. Article 9, section 1 states that “[a] 
general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the 
 
 28. Id. §§ 44938(b)(1)–(2). 
 29. Id. § 44944. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. § 44955.  
 32. Vergara v. California, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 2598719, at *2 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. June 10, 2014). 
 33. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a). 
 34. Dep't of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 400 P.2d 321, 330 (Cal. 1965). 
 35. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249 n.11 (Cal. 1971), en banc. 
 36. Id. at 1249. 
 37. Id. 
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preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the Legislature 
shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, 
scientific . . . improvement.”38 Article 9, section 5 directs the Legislature 
to “provide for a system of common schools by which a free school shall 
be kept up and supported in each district.”39 
The California Supreme Court previously tackled educational 
equality in the Serrano v. Priest cases40 and in Butt v. California.41 In 
Serrano I and II, the court held that education was a “fundamental 
interest” and accordingly found the state’s school financing system did 
not stand up to the rigors of strict scrutiny under the state constitution’s 
equal protection clause.42 Butt v. California43 held that a district could not 
end the school year six weeks early to remedy a revenue shortfall, and in 
doing so, the court stated that California could not deny “basic 
educational equality to the students of particular districts,” and that 
“[t]he State itself bears the ultimate authority and responsibility to 
ensure that its district-based system of common schools provides basic 
equality of educational opportunity.”44 The Vergara court noted that 
while Serrano I and II and Butt address “a lack of equality of education,” 
it was applying “these constitutional principles to the quality of the 
educational experience.”45 
The Vergara plaintiffs made three claims: (1) that the Challenged 
Statutes led to grossly ineffective teachers being granted and retaining 
tenure, (2) that grossly ineffective teachers are disproportionately placed 
in schools serving predominately low-income and minority student 
populations, and (3) that “the Challenged Statutes violate [the Plaintiffs’] 
fundamental rights to equality of education by adversely affecting the 
quality of the education they are afforded by the state.”46 
The court relied heavily in its opinion on expert testimony about 
the effect of grossly ineffective teachers on students. Judge Treu noted 
that “[t]he evidence is compelling. Indeed, it shocks the conscience.”47 
The plaintiffs defined “grossly ineffective teachers” as those teachers in 
the bottom five percent of performance of all teachers, although it was 
 
 38. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1.  
 39. Id. § 5.  
 40. 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971), en banc ("Serrano I"); 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976), en 
banc ("Serrano II"). 
 41. 842 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1992), en banc.  
 42. 487 P.2d at 1263; 557 P.2d at 951.  
 43. 842 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1992).  
 44. Id. at 1251.  
 45. Vergara v. California, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 2598719, at *2 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. June 10, 2014) (emphasis added). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at *4. 
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not clearly explained in the trial how teachers were determined to be in 
the bottom five percent.48 Dr. Raj Chetty testified as an expert for the 
plaintiffs about the long-term effects of teachers on student outcomes, 
namely that “a single year in a classroom with a grossly ineffective 
teacher costs students $1.4 million in lifetime earnings per classroom.”49 
Noting the importance of teachers, Dr. Chetty’s study found that above 
average teachers have beneficial effects on students in numerous areas, 
such as the probability that a student would attend college,50 the quality 
of the college students chose to attend,51 earning potential,52 lower 
teenage birth rates,53 and retirement savings.54 
The Vergara court also found the testimony of Dr. Thomas J. Kane, 
as to the effect of grossly ineffective teachers, to be persuasive.55 Dr. 
Kane testified that in a single year, students in Los Angeles Unified 
School District (LAUSD) lost 9.54 months of learning in English 
language arts56 and 11.73 months of learning in math when they were 
taught by a teacher in the bottom five percent of competence, rather than 
by an average teacher.57 The negative impact of ineffective teachers was 
nearly twice as large for students in LAUSD as compared to New York 
City, although his testimony did not hypothesize the reason for this 
gap.58 According to Dr. Kane’s testimony, black and Hispanic LAUSD 
students were disproportionately taught by teachers in the bottom five 
percent of competence, with black students forty-three percent more 
likely to be taught by a teacher in the bottom five percent and Hispanic 
students sixty-eight percent more likely.59 
The judge did not think that the defendants were able to dispute 
charges that “a significant number of grossly ineffective teachers [are] 
 
 48. Vergara Trial Day 3: Testimony of Dr. Raj Chetty, STUDENTS MATTER (Jan. 30, 
2014, 2:04 PM), http://studentsmatter.org/event/vergara-trial-day-3/ 
?instance_id=178 (discussed at 56:50 in video of Dr. Chetty's testimony). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Raj Chetty et al., The Long-Term Impacts of Teachers: Teacher Value-Added 
and Student Outcomes in Adulthood, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH 36 (Dec. 
2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17699.pdf.  
 51. Id. at 37–38. 
 52. Id. at 39. 
 53. Id. at 41. 
 54. Id. at 42. 
 55. Vergara v. California, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 2598719, at *4 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. June 10, 2014). 
 56. Thomas J. Kane, Presentation on Measurements of Teacher Effectiveness and 
Teacher Effectiveness in the Los Angeles Unified School District, STUDENTS MATTER 14 
(Feb. 6, 2014), http://studentsmatter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ 
SM_Kane-Demonstratives_02.06.14.pdf; Vergara, 2014 WL 2598719, at *4.  
 57. Kane, supra note 56, at 15. 
 58. Id. at 12. 
 59. Id. at 16. 
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currently active in California classrooms.”60 Dr. David Berliner, an 
expert called by the State defendants, stated on cross-examination that 
probably one to three percent of teachers in California consistently has 
poor student outcomes.61 The court extrapolated that with roughly 
275,000 teachers in California, this means that the number of grossly 
ineffective teachers likely ranges from 2,750 to 8,250.62 The court found 
that “the number of grossly ineffective teachers has a direct, real, 
appreciable, and negative impact on a significant number of California 
students, now and well into the future for as long as said teachers hold 
their positions.”63 
Because the court found that Plaintiffs had proven that the 
Challenged Statutes “impose[d] a real and appreciable impact on 
students’ fundamental right to equality of education,” the court applied 
strict scrutiny to the provisions of the tenure statutes to determine if 
they would survive equal protection analysis.64 Under strict scrutiny 
analysis, the State Defendants bore the “burden of establishing not only 
that the State has a compelling interest which justifies the Challenged 
Statutes but that the distinctions drawn by the laws are necessary to 
further their purpose.”65 
The court began by analyzing the Permanent Employment Statute, 
finding that it did not present a “legally cognizable reason (let alone a 
compelling one)” for granting tenure after such a short period of time.66 
During the first two years of teaching, new teachers are required to 
successfully complete an induction program, a program that assesses 
and supports new teachers, in order to receive a clear teaching 
credential.67 While the statute calls for districts to grant tenure after 
these two years, teachers must be given notice before March 15th of the 
second year, “eliminat[ing] 2–3 months of the ‘two year’ period.”68 
 
 60. Vergara, 2014 WL 2598719, at *4.  
 61. Id. After the decision, Dr. Berliner told a Slate reporter that he “pulled 
[the one to three percent number] out of the air,” and that the number was “just 
a ballpark estimate, based on [his] visiting lots and lots of classrooms.” Jordan 
Weissmann, Fuzzy Math: The Guesstimate That Struck Down California's Teacher 
Tenure Laws, SLATE (June 12, 2014, 1:07 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/ 
business/moneybox/2014/06/judge_strikes_down_california_s_teacher_tenure
_laws_a_made_up_statistic.html. 
 62. Vergara, 2014 WL 2598719, at *4.  
 63. Id. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at *5 (emphasis added). 
 67. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44259(c)(2) (West 2012). See also About Beginning 
Teacher Support and Assessment (BTSA), BEGINNING TEACHER SUPPORT AND 
ASSESSMENT (BTSA) INDUCTION, http://www.btsa.ca.gov/about.html (last 
visited Dec. 5, 2014) (describing BTSA's vision and goals). 
 68. Vergara, 2014 WL 2598719, at *4.  
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“Bizarrely,” teachers can thus be granted tenure before the end of the 
credential-granting induction program, resulting in the possibility that a 
teacher might be granted tenure in March, but not be recommended for 
credentialing at the end of the induction program in May.69 This would 
leave the district with the awkward problem of having to figure out 
what to do with a non-credentialed teacher who has tenure.70 
The court found extensive evidence, including some from the 
defense, that the two year window was too short for districts to make 
informed decisions about permanent employment.71 The short window 
for tenure decision leads districts to grant tenure where they would not 
have if given more time, and to not grant tenure where more time could 
have given new teachers “an adequate opportunity to establish their 
competence.”72 Two of the State defendants agreed that a three to five 
year time frame for making the tenure decision would be mutually 
beneficial for both students and teachers.73 The court noted that 
California is an “outlier state” by having a probationary period of only 
two years; the vast majority of states with a tenure system employ a 
three to five year probationary period.74 For these reasons, the court 
found that the burden of the strict scrutiny test had not been met and 
held that the Permanent Employment Statute was unconstitutional 
under the equal protection clause of the California Constitution.75 
The court then turned its attention to the three Dismissal Statutes, 
which it found collectively did not meet the burden of strict scrutiny.76 
The court heard evidence that under the Dismissal Statutes, districts 
wishing to dismiss an ineffective teacher could spend anywhere from 
$50,000 to $450,000 over the course of two to almost ten years.77 
Accordingly, school officials do not want to spend the time and money 
on dismissal cases, leaving grossly ineffective teachers in the 
classroom.78 Defense witness Dr. Susan Moore Johnson found that 
because administrators believe dismissing tenured teachers under the 
current system to be “impossible,” dismissals in California are 
“extremely rare.”79 In fact, the court found evidence that LAUSD had 
“350 grossly ineffective teachers it wished to dismiss at the time of trial 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at *5. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at *6. 
 77. Id. at *5. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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regarding whom the dismissal process had not yet been initiated.”80 
While the court was careful to be respectful of legitimate due process 
issues, it found that the current Dismissal Statutes were “uber due 
process.”81 Districts were able to resolve discipline cases of other 
classified public employees “with much less time and expense than 
those of teachers,” even though classified employees did not have a 
lesser property interest in continued employment than teachers.82 
Finding “the current system required by the Dismissal Statutes to be so 
complex, time consuming and expensive as to make an effective, 
efficient yet fair dismissal of a grossly ineffective teacher illusory,” the 
court held the Dismissal Statutes unconstitutional under the equal 
protection clause of the California Constitution.83 
Finally, the court found the LIFO statute did not meet the burden of 
strict scrutiny.84 It found fault in that the statute did not contain an 
exception or waiver for teacher effectiveness.85 Because last-hired 
teachers are automatically the first ones laid off, gifted junior teachers 
are laid off before grossly ineffective senior teachers.86 The court found it 
preposterous that the defendants could have a compelling interest “in 
the de facto separation of students from competent teachers, and a like 
interest in the de facto retention of incompetent ones.”87 California is a 
“distinct minority” in that it is only one of ten states that use seniority as 
the sole factor to be considered in layoffs, whereas twenty states allow 
the possibility that seniority may be considered among other factors.88 
Because the LIFO statute did not survive strict scrutiny, the court held it 
unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the California 
Constitution.89 
While not essential to its holding, the court was especially 
concerned that poor and minority students were disproportionately 
affected by the Challenged Statutes.90 “Unfortunately, the most 
vulnerable students, those attending high-poverty, low-performing 
schools, are far more likely than their wealthier peers to attend schools 
having a disproportionate number of underqualified, inexperienced, 
 
 80. Id.; Vergara Trial Day 31, STUDENTS MATTER (Mar. 21, 2014, 6:14 PM), 
http://studentsmatter.org/event/vergara-trial-day-31/?instance_id=152. 
 81. Vergara, 2014 WL 2598719, at *5. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at *6. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. at *7. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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out-of-field, and ineffective teachers and administrators. Because 
minority children disproportionately attend such schools, minority 
students bear the brunt of staffing inequalities.”91 The “Dance of the 
Lemons,” or the churning of teachers throughout the system, “greatly 
affects the stability of the learning process to the detriment of [high-
poverty and minority] students.”92 
Finding all five of the Challenged Statutes unconstitutional, the 
court remanded the case to the Legislature to “enact legislation on the 
issues . . . that passes constitutional muster, thus providing each child in 
[California] with a basically equal opportunity to achieve a quality 
education.”93 Citing Alexander Hamilton in Federalist Paper 78 and the 
separation of powers doctrine, the court did not make any 
recommendations for future legislation.94 However, from the opinion it 
seems as though the court could be satisfied if California’s statutes on 
tenure fell more in line with the majority of other states, e.g., tenure 
granted after a three to five year probationary period, less stringent due 
process, and a rejection of LIFO with seniority as the only factor 
considered in layoffs. 
II. ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL ALASKA COPYCAT CASE 
A potential claim brought in Alaska would look similar to the claim 
brought in California in the Vergara case. Potential plaintiffs would need 
to establish that the Alaska Constitution affords a fundamental right to 
education, and that this fundamental right has been violated because the 
tenure statutes lead to inequality in education when students are taught 
by grossly ineffective teachers who have been granted and retain tenure. 
A potential copycat case in Alaska will first identify relevant tenure 
statutes to challenge (“Potential Challenged Statutes”). Alaska Statute 
sections 14.20.150 (“Alaska Permanent Employment Statute”), 14.20.180 
(“Alaska Dismissal Statute”), and 14.20.177 (“Alaska LIFO”) are the 
provisions that most closely mirror the Challenged Statutes in Vergara. 
The Alaska Permanent Employment Statute states that a teacher 
acquires tenure rights through continuous employment in the same 
district for three full school years, contingent upon an evaluation stating 
that the teacher’s performance meets district performance standards.95 
The Alaska Dismissal Statute governs the procedures for dismissal 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.150 (2012). 
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or non-retention.96 Under the Alaska Dismissal Statute, before a teacher 
is dismissed, the district must give the teacher written notice and a pre-
termination hearing that “comport[s] with the minimum requirements 
of due process,” if after the pre-termination hearing the employer 
continues with the dismissal, the teacher must again be provided with 
written notice. The dismissal is effective upon receipt of the notice.97 
Within fifteen days of receiving notice of dismissal, a teacher has the 
right to either request a hearing before the school board or to invoke 
grievance procedures.98 If a teacher requests a post-termination hearing, 
the parties may be represented by counsel, cross-examine witnesses, and 
the teacher may subpoena persons whose statements were used in the 
dismissal decision.99 The statute does not provide for any formal 
discovery. The results of the hearing may be appealed to the superior 
court for judicial review on the administrative record.100 If a teacher 
requests grievance procedures, an informal hearing takes place in front 
of the board, the decision of which can be submitted to arbitration for a 
final and binding decision.101 
The Alaska LIFO statute states that if a school district has a 
reduction in force, tenured teachers cannot be put on layoff status until 
the district has given notice to all non-tenured teachers.102 
In determining if any or all of the Potential Challenged Statutes 
violate the Alaska Constitution, it is essential to identify relevant 
constitutional provisions and case law that would govern a potential 
case. The equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitution states that 
“all persons are equal and entitled to equal rights, opportunities, and 
protection under the law.”103 Alaska provides for the right of public 
education in article VII, section 1, requiring the legislature to “establish 
and maintain a system of public schools open to all children of the 
State.”104 
Rather than using tiered scrutiny levels for equal protection 
challenges, as do federal courts, Alaskan courts use “a sliding scale 
approach to determine the level of scrutiny that is required in reviewing 
a challenged statute.”105 “As legislation burdens more fundamental 
 
 96. Id. § 14.20.180. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. § 14.20.177. 
 103. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 104. Id. art. VII, § 1. 
 105. Matanuska-Susitna Borough Sch. Dist. v. State, 931 P.2d 391, 396 (Alaska 
1997). 
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rights . . . it is subjected to more rigorous scrutiny at a more elevated 
position on our sliding scale.”106 While the level of scrutiny is essentially 
the same where fundamental rights are infringed or suspect categories 
are involved, the courts “avoid[] outright categorization of fundamental 
and nonfundamental rights” with the goal of making “a more flexible, 
less result-oriented analysis.”107 
The courts use three steps in applying the sliding scale of 
scrutiny.108 First, the court determines what weight to afford to the 
constitutional interest impaired by the challenged provision.109 The 
greater the primacy of the interest involved, the greater a burden the 
state will have in justifying its legislation.110 “[W]hen a classification is 
based on a suspect factor . . . or infringes on fundamental rights (for 
example, voting, litigating, or the exercise of intimate personal choices) a 
classification will be upheld only when the enactment furthers a 
‘compelling state interest’ and the enactment is ‘necessary’ to the 
achievement of that interest,” also known as strict scrutiny.111 Next, the 
court examines the purposes served by the challenged legislation.112 The 
level of review depends on the weight from the first step; at the low end 
of the continuum, the state need only show that its objectives were 
legitimate, and, at the high end, that a compelling state interest 
motivated the legislation.113 Finally, the court evaluates the particular 
means the state employed to further its goals.114 On the low end of the 
sliding scale, the state must show a substantial relationship between the 
means and ends, and on the high end, the state must show that it used 
the least restrictive means necessary.115 
The Alaska Supreme Court has never directly applied fundamental 
rights equal protection analysis to an education issue. However, in 
Breese v. Smith,116 the court stated in dicta, without employing any 
reasoning, that the education clause of the Alaska Constitution 
“guarantees all children of Alaska a right to public education.”117 The 
court also did not rely on the education clause in the final holding, 
where it stated that the expulsion of a student whose long hair violated 
 
 106. State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1193 (Alaska 1983). 
 107. Id.  
 108. Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264, 269 (Alaska 1984). 
 109. Matanuska-Susitna Borough Sch. Dist., 931 P.2d at 396. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Public Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Gallant, 153 P.3d 346, 349–50 (Alaska 2007). 
 112. Matanuska-Susitna Borough Sch. Dist., 931 P.2d at 396. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 396–97. 
 116. 501 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1972). 
 117. Id. at 167. 
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school regulations violated that student’s “natural right to ‘liberty’,” as 
guaranteed under article I, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution.118 
In Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated School System,119 the court looked 
at the issue of whether the state was constitutionally required to provide 
secondary schools in rural communities.120 However, the court only 
analyzed the claim through the article VII, section 1 constitutional right 
to education, not through an equal protection lens.121 The Hootch court 
noted that the Alaska Constitution contains no uniformity requirement 
for the school system, likely because such a requirement would prove 
unworkable in Alaska’s unique environment.122 For this reason, the 
court found that the article VII, section 1 education provision “permits 
some differences in the manner of providing education.”123 The court 
acknowledged that allowing differences in providing education may 
lead to disadvantages, but “[s]o long as they are not violative of equal 
protection, the nature and proper means of overcoming the 
disadvantages present questions for the legislature.”124 The court in 
Hootch reaffirmed the Breese dicta that children in Alaska have a right to 
education, and that the education clause “imposes a duty upon the state 
legislature, and it confers upon Alaska school age children a right to 
education.”125 
In Matanuska-Susitna Borough School District,126 the plaintiffs 
challenged the state funding laws under the equal protection clause, 
claiming that they and their children’s interests in education were 
impaired by the laws.127 The plaintiffs claimed that if local contribution 
to the operating costs of the Borough were eliminated, there would be 
more funding for the children’s schools, which would lead to a better 
education.128 However, the plaintiffs “failed to present any evidence 
arguably showing that the educational interests of their children [were] 
disparately affected by the local contribution to operating costs required 
of the Borough.”129 With no evidence of unequal treatment, the equal 
protection challenge was dismissed because “[i]n the absence of any 
 
 118. Id. at 168. 
 119. 536 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1975). 
 120. Id. at 796. 
 121. Id. at 798–99. 
 122. Id. at 803. 
 123. Id. at 804. 
 124. Id. at 804–05. 
 125. Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated Sch. Sys., 536 P.2d 793, 799 (Alaska 
1975). 
 126. 931 P.2d 391, 396 (Alaska 1997). 
 127. Id. at 395. 
 128. Id. at 397. 
 129. Id. 
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evidence of disparate treatment, there is no basis for an equal protection 
claim, and we need not subject the challenged laws to sliding scale 
scrutiny.”130 
While the Alaska Supreme Court has not held education to be a 
fundamental right for equal protection analysis purposes, it also has not 
foreclosed this possibility. In fact, the superior court in Kasayulie v. 
Alaska131 did hold that education is a fundamental right.132 The court 
granted summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claim that Alaska’s 
method of funding capital projects for education was void under the 
education and equal protection provisions of the Alaska constitution 
and violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.133 The court 
acknowledged the value Alaska puts on education by guaranteeing all 
Alaskan children a right to education in article VII, section 1 of the state 
constitution,134 and found that “[b]ecause the interest is expressly 
provided for in the Constitution, it is a fundamental right under the 
equal protection analysis.”135 
However, other states’ courts have determined that mere inclusion 
in the constitution does not automatically make an interest a 
fundamental right for equal protection purposes. For instance, article 
VIII, section 3 of the Oregon Constitution states that “[t]he Legislative 
Assembly shall provide by law for the establishment of a uniform, and 
general system of Common schools.”136 The Oregon Supreme Court in 
the school funding case Olsen v. State137 declined to extend fundamental 
interest status to education simply because it was provided for in the 
state constitution.138 The court noted that the Oregon Bill of Rights also 
has a “guaranteed constitutional right to sell and serve intoxicating 
liquor by the drink,” but the court did not see that as a fundamental 
interest.139 While the court acknowledged the importance of education, it 
decided not to declare education to be a fundamental interest for equal 
protection analysis.140 In fact, the Oregon court does not seem to have 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. No. 3AN-97-3782 CIV, 1999 WL 34793400 (Alaska Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 
1999). 
 132. See id. at *5 (granting plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on 
facilities funding).  
 133. Id. at *1–2. 
 134. Id. at *6. See also Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 167 (Alaska 1972) (using 
the fact that “article VII, section 1 . . . guarantees all children of Alaska a right to 
public education” as a basis for summary judgment).  
 135. Kasayulie, 1999 WL 34793400 at *6.  
 136. OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3. 
 137. 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 1976). 
 138. Id. at 144. 
 139. Id. at 144–45.  
 140. Id. at 145.  
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even embraced the idea of “categorizing an interest as a fundamental or 
nonfundamental interest.”141 
New Jersey also declined to classify education as a fundamental 
interest in the Robinson v. Cahill142 school funding challenge. Article VIII, 
section 4, paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution calls for the state 
legislature to “provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough 
and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the 
children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years.”143 
However, the New Jersey Supreme Court does not believe that the 
state’s decision to furnish a service makes that service a fundamental 
right.144 The court seems wary of fundamental right analysis because 
“[t]he term ‘fundamental right’ has not been defined.”145 
While states such as Oregon and New Jersey do not consider 
education to be a fundamental right, despite provisions in each states’ 
constitutions, those states also seem to reject fundamental interest 
analysis altogether in the Olsen and Cahill decisions. However, Alaska’s 
sliding scale of scrutiny for equal protection claims actively examines 
the primacy of the constitutional interest impaired by challenged 
legislation to determine if an interest is fundamental, important, or less 
important.146 Because the court has previously called education a 
right,147 and because it examines the importance of interests in its equal 
protection analysis,148 the Alaska Supreme Court may be more inclined 
to extend fundamental right status to education than were the supreme 
courts of Oregon and New Jersey. 
A potential challenge to Alaska’s teacher tenure system would have 
the best chance of success if the court found that education is a 
fundamental right deserving of strict scrutiny under the equal 
protection clause. While Alaska has established that education is a 
right,149 the Supreme Court has not declared that education is a 
fundamental right for equal protection purposes. Hootch acknowledges 
that choices in how education is provided will lead to differences, but 
that addressing those differences is a matter for the legislature unless 
 
 141. Id. at 144. 
 142. 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973). 
 143. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1. 
 144. Cahill, 303 A.2d at 285–86. 
 145. Id. at 284. 
 146. Matanuska-Susitna Borough Sch. Dist. v. State, 931 P.2d 391, 396 (Alaska 
1997).  
 147. Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated Sch. Sys., 536 P.2d 793, 799 (Alaska 
1975). 
 148. Matanuska-Susitna Borough Sch. Dist., 931 P.2d at 396. 
 149. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 167 (Alaska 
1972). 
ARTICLE 6 - COOPER (DO NOT DELETE) 12/7/2015  6:16 PM 
2015 EVALUATING TEACHER TENURE IN ALASKA 411 
they violate the equal protection clause.150 For this reason, a potential 
challenge would need to be brought under article I, section 1, the equal 
protection clause, rather than under article VII, section 1, the education 
provision. 
Even if the court did not decide that education is a fundamental 
right, it is still likely that an issue of this nature would get more than the 
minimal level of scrutiny on the sliding scale. In general, the courts 
apply minimal scrutiny to cases involving economic and commercial 
interests.151 Alaska’s minimal scrutiny is slightly more stringent than the 
federal standard of rational basis review.152 Under minimal scrutiny, the 
state must show that “the means chosen . . . bear a ‘fair and substantial’ 
relation to the attainment of a legitimate government objective.”153 
Alaska courts do not “hypothesize facts which would sustain otherwise 
questionable legislation as was the case under the traditional rational 
basis standard.”154 Under the argument that the current system of tenure 
disparately impacts the fundamental interests of students who are stuck 
in classrooms with grossly ineffective teachers, the statutes concern 
more than mere economic or commercial interests. For this reason, 
minimal scrutiny does not seem to be the best fit for a potential 
challenge to Alaska’s teacher tenure laws. 
State, Departments of Transportation and Labor v. Enserch Alaska 
Construction, Inc.155 typifies a case that falls in between minimal scrutiny 
and strict scrutiny.156 At issue in Enserch was whether the state could 
compel companies to give a “hiring preference to residents of 
economically distressed zones” to work on public works projects, 
thereby making it more difficult for those who lived outside of the 
economically distressed zones to be hired for these projects.157 The court 
determined that “the right to engage in an economic endeavor within a 
particular industry is an ‘important’ right for state equal protection 
purposes.”158 Because the statute affected an “important” interest, the 
court applied close scrutiny, requiring the state to prove that “[its] 
 
 150. Hootch, 536 P.2d at 804–05.  
 151. Pan-Alaska Constr., Inc. v. State, Dep't of Admin., Div. of Gen. Servs., 
892 P.2d 159, 162 (Alaska 1995). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. (quoting State, Dep’t of Revenue v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621, 629 (Alaska 
1993)).  
 154. Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362 (Alaska 1976), abrogated by 
Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n v. Apokedak, 606 P.2d 1255, 1266 (Alaska 
1980). See Apokedak, 606 P.2d at 1266 (stating that Isakson did not invalidate the 
gear license requirement in section 16.43.260(a) of the Alaska Statutes).   
 155. 787 P.2d 624 (Alaska 1989). 
 156. Id. at 633–34.  
 157. Id. at 625. 
 158. Id. at 632 (quoting Apokedak, 606 P.2d at 1266).  
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interest underlying the enactment b[e] not only legitimate, but 
important, and that the nexus between the enactment and the important 
interest it serves be close.”159 
Strict scrutiny of the Potential Challenged Statutes would almost 
certainly be necessary to win a case of this nature. According to Public 
Employees’ Retirement System v. Gallant,160 two types of cases 
automatically receive strict scrutiny analysis: cases involving laws with 
classifications based on a suspect class and cases involving laws that 
infringe on a fundamental right.161 A potential tenure challenger could 
not argue that the tenure statutes themselves classify based on race or 
another suspect classification, and so would not receive strict scrutiny 
under that prong. The challengers would instead want to argue for the 
court to declare education a fundamental right so that the laws that 
infringe the right automatically receive strict scrutiny. 
If the court does not declare education to be a fundamental right, 
then the level of scrutiny would be determined using Alaska’s sliding 
scale of scrutiny. The court would first look at what weight to give the 
constitutional interest impaired by the Potential Challenged Statutes. 
Plaintiffs have several arguments on their side that the court should 
place a high burden on the state to justify its legislation. First, in the 
landmark case, Brown v. Board of Education,162 the United States Supreme 
Court declared that “[t]oday, education is perhaps the most important 
function of state and local governments . . . . Such an opportunity, where 
the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made 
available to all on equal terms.”163 Additionally, the state of Alaska 
considers education to be important enough to enshrine the right to a 
public education in its constitution.164 Furthermore, an analogy can be 
made between education and voting, which is considered a fundamental 
right both at the state165 and federal level,166 as “both are crucial to 
 
 159. Id. at 633. 
 160. 153 P.3d 346 (Alaska 2007). 
 161. Id. at 349–50. 
 162. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee Cnty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483 
(1954). 
 163. Id. at 493. 
 164. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
 165. See Vogler v. Miller, 651 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska 1982) (stating that the right to 
vote is fundamental and that “[n]o right is more precious in a free country than 
that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, 
as good citizens, we must live”) (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 
(1968)).  
 166. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (“Almost a century ago . . . 
the Court referred to ‘the political franchise of voting’ as ‘a fundamental political 
right, because preservative of all rights.’” [sic]) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 
118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).  
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participation in, and the functioning of, a democracy.”167 “At a 
minimum, education makes more meaningful the casting of a ballot. 
More significantly, it is likely to provide the understanding of, and the 
interest in, public issues which are the spur to involvement in other civil 
and political activities.”168 Education is crucial in supporting “each and 
every other value of a democratic society—participation, 
communication, and social mobility, to name but a few.”169 The rationale 
California relied on in Serrano I,170 declaring education a fundamental 
right, is equally applicable to Alaska. Education gives individuals an 
“opportunity to compete successfully in the economic marketplace, 
despite a disadvantaged background,” is “universally relevant” since all 
people benefit from education, and is unmatched in the extent to which 
“it molds . . . the youth of society.”171 Even if the court declines to 
analyze the Potential Challenged Statutes under strict scrutiny, these 
reasons form a compelling argument for using a close scrutiny standard 
instead. 
After determining the level of scrutiny, the court would look at the 
purposes of the statute. If the court places the greatest possible weight 
on the constitutional interest infringed and analyzes the issues under the 
framework of strict scrutiny, then the state would need to show a 
compelling state interest in the tenure statutes.172 Under the standard of 
close scrutiny, the state would need to show that it has an important 
interest, and on the most relaxed end of the sliding scale of scrutiny, the 
state would only need to prove that it has a legitimate government 
objective for the challenged legislation.173 
Finally, the court would look at the means used to achieve the 
state’s interest. Under strict scrutiny, the state would need to show that 
it used the least restrictive means to achieve its ends, and if a less 
restrictive alternative would accomplish the purpose then the 
classification will be invalidated. Under close scrutiny, the state would 
need to show that the nexus between the enactment and the important 
interest it serves be close.174 On the low end of the sliding scale of 
scrutiny, the state would need to show that there was a substantial 
 
 167. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1258 (Cal. 1971).  
 168. Id.  
 169. Id. (quoting John E. Coons, William H. Clune, III & Stephen D. 
Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State 
Financial Structures, 57 CAL. L. REV. 305, 362–63 (1969)).  
 170. Id. at 1258–59. 
 171. Id. at 1259.  
 172. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Gallant, 153 P.3d 346, 349–50 (Alaska 2007). 
 173. See State, Dep’ts of Transp. and Labor v. Enserch Alaska Constr., Inc., 787 
P.2d 624, 633 (Alaska 1989) (explaining the sliding scale of scrutiny). 
 174. Id. 
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relationship between the means used in the Potential Challenged 
Statutes and the ends. 
As in Vergara, a challenge to the tenure system in Alaska would 
also require potential plaintiffs to establish that grossly ineffective 
teachers have a detrimental effect on students as the basis of the equal 
protection claim. This could be accomplished using much of the research 
already conducted by the Vergara plaintiffs. For instance, potential 
plaintiffs could use the Chetty study cited in the Vergara decision 
showing the positive effects of having an effective teacher versus a 
grossly ineffective teacher.175 However, that study and similar studies 
looked at data from “a large urban school district,”176 and Alaska’s 
school system is primarily comprised of small, rural schools. 
Unfortunately, almost no research addresses the effects of teacher 
quality in rural schools. 
California’s Permanent Employment Statute and the Alaska 
Permanent Employment Statute are different enough that a court would 
not likely find Alaska’s statute to violate equal protection. While the 
California statute grants tenure during the second year of teaching,177 
Alaska requires three full years of continuous teaching in a district 
before a teacher acquires tenure rights.178 Though one extra year before 
granting tenure may not seem like a significant difference, one study 
found that while teaching quality improves significantly in the first year 
and makes smaller gains over the next few years, “there is little evidence 
that improvements continue after the first three years.”179 For this 
reason, waiting to grant tenure after three years rather than two gives 
administrators important data as to what to expect from the teacher in 
the years to come. Additionally, the extra year makes Alaska fall in line 
with majority of states that require three or more years before making 
tenure decisions.180 Thirty-one states make tenure decisions after three 
years, while only six states make tenure decisions after two or fewer 
years.181 Given these factors and the position of the Alaskan courts to 
accord deference to the state legislature in determining how best to 
 
 175. Chetty, supra note 50, at 36–42. 
 176. Id. at 13. 
 177. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44929.21(b) (West 2012).  
 178. ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.150 (2012). 
 179. Steven G. Rivkin, Eric A. Hanushek & John F. Kain, Teachers, Schools, and 
Academic Achievement, 73 ECONOMETRICA 417, 449 (2005). 
 180. Vergara v. California, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 2598719, at *5 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. June 10, 2014); State of the States 2012: Teacher Effectiveness Policies, NAT’L 
COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY 11 (2012), http://www.nctq.org/dmsView/ 
State_of_the_States_2012_Teacher_Effectiveness_Policies_NCTQ_Report. 
 181. Rivkin, supra note 179. 
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overcome differences in educational quality,182 the Alaska Permanent 
Employment Statute will likely survive an equal protection challenge. If 
analyzed under strict scrutiny, the state can show that it has a 
compelling interest in granting tenure after three years: doing so may 
help the state retain good teachers and prevents teachers from being 
fired for arbitrary reasons. The three year period is narrowly tailored to 
achieve this end by giving administrators adequate time to inform their 
tenure decision as the gains in teacher quality are quite small after three 
years of teaching. Even if the Alaska Permanent Employment Statute 
were analyzed under a more relaxed method of scrutiny, it would still 
be able to survive if it can survive the strictest level of scrutiny. 
Under California’s Dismissal Statutes, removing ineffective 
teachers is a tedious, expensive, and time-consuming process that can 
take between two and ten years and cost between $50,000 to $450,000.183 
California’s Dismissal Statutes went above and beyond the minimum 
due process that is accorded to other public employees of the state, so 
much so that Judge Treu referred to the procedures as “uber due 
process.”184 The Alaska Dismissal Statute, on the other hand, comports 
for the most part with the minimum due process given to other state 
public employees. The Alaska constitution parallels the federal 
constitution, providing due process protection to public employees who 
may only be terminated for just cause185 because these employees “have 
a sufficient property interest in continued employment to warrant due 
process protection prior to termination.”186 At a minimum, the employee 
is entitled to notice of dismissal, an explanation of the evidence against 
him, and an opportunity to present his side at an adversarial pre-
termination hearing.187 A full judicial hearing is not necessary, but “the 
employee must be allowed to present a defense by testimonial and other 
evidence” before dismissal.188 If the outcome of the pre-termination 
hearing is dismissal, then “federal law entitles a public employee to a 
formal evidentiary post-termination hearing within a reasonable 
time.”189 
The Alaska Dismissal Statute comports with the minimum 
requirements of due process. The statute requires written notice, a 
 
 182. See Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated Sch. Sys., 536 P.2d 793, 804–05 
(Alaska 1975) (stating that it was a matter for the legislature to determine how 
best to address differences in educational quality).  
 183. Vergara, 2014 WL 2598719, at *5. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Storrs v. Anchorage, 721 P.2d 1146, 1150 (Alaska 1986). 
 186. Id. at 1148. 
 187. Id. at 1149. 
 188. Id. at 1150. 
 189. Id. at 1149.  
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statement of cause and a bill of the particulars, and an adversarial pre-
termination hearing,190 as is required by the minimum due process 
requirements of the Alaska Constitution.191 If the pre-termination 
hearing results in a notice of dismissal, the teacher may request a post-
termination hearing, with the right to be represented by counsel, to 
cross-examine witnesses, and to subpoena witnesses,192 all of which are 
in line with minimum due process.193 Instead of a post-termination 
hearing, a tenured teacher who has been dismissed may request 
grievance procedures with an optional informal hearing and a binding 
arbitration hearing.194 While grievance procedures occur under 
arbitration rather than a hearing in front of the school board, grievance 
procedures perform basically the same function as the post-termination 
hearing. 
Because the Alaska Dismissal Statute mirrors the requirements of 
minimal due process, the statute would be able to survive any potential 
challenge. Under strict scrutiny analysis, the compelling interest for the 
procedures in the Alaska Dismissal Statute is to comply with both state 
and constitutional requirements of minimum due process for dismissal 
of public employees who must have just cause to be dismissed. Because 
the statute would survive strict scrutiny, it would also be able to survive 
less exacting levels of scrutiny. Unlike the California Dismissal Statutes, 
Alaska does not require “uber due process” to dismiss its tenured 
teachers.195 
Alaska and California use almost identical last-in-first-out policies 
in the case of reductions in force to dismiss non-tenured recent hires 
before more senior tenured teachers without regard to teacher quality.196 
The court in Vergara found fault with California’s LIFO statute because 
“[n]o matter how gifted the junior teacher, and no matter how grossly 
 
 190. ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.180(a) (2012). 
 191. See Storrs, 721 P.2d at 1149 (stating that “[a]t a minimum, the employee 
must receive oral or written notice of the proposed discharge, an explanation of 
the employer's evidence and an opportunity to present his position”). 
 192. ALASKA STAT. §§ 14.20.180(c)–(d). 
 193. See Storrs, 721 P.2d at 1149 (“When minimal pretermination procedures 
are followed, federal law entitles a public employee to a formal evidentiary post-
termination hearing within a reasonable time.”). 
 194. ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.180(e). 
 195. Vergara, 2014 WL 2598719, at *5. 
 196. See ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.177(c) (“[A] school district may place a tenured 
teacher on layoff status only after the district has given notice of nonretention to 
all nontenured teachers.”); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44955(b) (West 2012) (“[T]he 
services of no permanent employee may be terminated under the provisions of 
this section while any probationary employee, or any other employee with less 
seniority, is retained to render a service which said permanent employee is 
certificated and competent to render.”).  
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ineffective the senior teacher, the junior gifted one . . . is separated from 
[his or her students] and a senior grossly ineffective one . . . is left in 
place.”197 The California court boiled the issue down to the state’s 
requirement to assert a “compelling interest in the de facto separation of 
students from competent teachers, and a like interest in the de facto 
retention of incompetent ones,” which the court found “unfathomable” 
and “constitutionally unsupportable.”198 Additionally, California and 
Alaska are in the “distinct minority among other states that have 
addressed this issue” as they are two of only ten states that rely solely 
on seniority in making layoff decisions.199 Using the same reasoning as 
in Vergara, the court could find that laying off more gifted junior 
teachers before grossly ineffective senior teachers does not further a 
compelling state interest. 
The Vergara court, in dicta, seemed particularly appalled that the 
effects of the difficulty of firing grossly ineffective teachers fell primarily 
on poor and minority students. Los Angeles Unified School District, for 
instance, is overwhelmingly Hispanic, with 84 percent of the district’s 
population comprised of black or Hispanic students and only 8.7 percent 
white students.200 The same clustering of students cannot be seen in 
Alaska schools. The five “urban” school districts of Anchorage, 
Fairbanks, Juneau, Kenai, and Matanuska-Susitna enroll more than 70 
percent of students and 68 percent of teachers.201 All of the schools in 
these districts display remarkable diversity from school to school.202 
None of the high schools in those districts are close to having student 
bodies that are almost exclusively white or exclusively minority.203 In 
the rural districts of Alaska, such as in the Northwest Arctic Borough, 
the schools have less diversity, and the student bodies are 
overwhelmingly made up of Alaska Native students.204 However, 
schools in rural districts are the ones least likely to face issues with 
 
 197. Vergara, 2014 WL 2598719, at *6. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at *7. 
 200. DEP’T OF EDUC., Los Angeles Unified LEA Summary of Selected Facts, CIVIL 
RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION, 
http://ocrdata.ed.gov/Page?t=d&eid=30388&syk=6&pid=736 (last visited Nov. 
10, 2014).  
 201. DIANE HIRSHBERG & ALEXANDRA HILL, TURNOVER AMONG ALASKA’S 
TEACHERS: HOW MANY LEAVE THEIR JOBS? 3 (Inst. of Soc. and Econ. Research, 
Univ. of Alaska Anchorage 2006). 
 202. See generally Sch. Enrollment by Ethnicity as of Oct. 1, 2013, ALASKA DEP’T 
OF EDUC. AND EARLY DEV. ASSESSMENT (Mar. 6, 2014), http:// 
education.alaska.gov/stats/SchoolEthnicity/2014_School_Ethnicity_Report.pdf 
(listing the ethnicities of students in various Alaska school districts). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 104–06. 
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tenured teachers because they have such high teacher turnover rates.205 
Whereas the five urban districts have an average turnover rate of about 
ten percent of their teachers per year, rural districts face much higher 
rates, at about twenty-two percent.206 For this reason, urban districts are 
more affected by the tenure laws than rural districts are, and the urban 
districts do not see the same clustering of poor and minority students 
that could be seen in California. 
A potential case challenging Alaska’s tenure laws would face many 
obstacles to success. First, the Alaska Supreme Court has not declared 
education to be a fundamental right for equal protection purposes, as 
had the California Supreme Court. If the court failed to declare 
education a fundamental right in this potential case, getting to strict 
scrutiny to evaluate the tenure statutes would be difficult, but not 
impossible, under the sliding scrutiny scale. The Alaska Permanent 
Employment Statute and the Alaska Dismissal Statute are likely 
different enough from California’s Permanent Employment Statute and 
Dismissal Statutes that a court would be able to find that they survive 
strict scrutiny. Because the LIFO Statutes of both California and Alaska 
are substantively identical, a court could readily strike down the Alaska 
LIFO statute under the equal protection clause. Poor and minority 
students in Alaska are generally not enrolled in de facto segregated 
schools, so they are not disproportionately affected by grossly 
ineffective teachers being shunted to their schools, as was the case in 
California. The uncertain and mixed results make a Vergara-like case in 
Alaska seem like a foolhardy path to pursue. 
III. POTENTIAL LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
The court challenge to the tenure statutes made sense in California 
because teachers were granted tenure too early in their careers to know 
if they were truly effective, and districts had difficulty dismissing 
ineffective teachers due to the burdensome dismissal procedures and the 
LIFO statute. Those policies led to grossly ineffective teachers 
disproportionately teaching poor and minority students. The same 
cannot be said about Alaska’s tenure policies. Teachers in Alaska are 
granted tenure further into their careers and the procedures for 
dismissal conform with the minimum protections of due process. Poor 
 
 205. ALEXANDRA HILL & DIANE HIRSHBERG, ALASKA TEACHER TURNOVER, 
SUPPLY, AND DEMAND: 2013 HIGHLIGHTS 2 (UAA Ctr. for Alaska Educ. Policy 
Research, 2013).  
 206. ALEXANDRA HILL & DIANE HIRSHBERG, TURNOVER AMONG ALASKA 
TEACHERS: IS IT CHANGING? 1 (Inst. of Soc. and Econ. Research, Univ. of Alaska 
Anchorage, 2008).  
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and minority students are not disproportionately placed in classrooms 
with grossly ineffective teachers in Alaska the way they were in 
California. Alaska schools on the whole are not racially segregated, and 
the schools that do have high percentages of Alaska Native students are 
the schools least likely to be affected by tenure laws because those 
schools tend to have the most difficulty in retaining teachers. A court 
challenge of Alaska’s tenure statutes is unlikely to affect students in 
Alaska’s rural communities at all. 
Even if Alaska is fairly insulated from a judicial attack on its tenure 
statutes, the legislature should nevertheless reexamine the statutes to 
ensure that they will lead to the most positive outcomes for students. 
Alaska is already considering making changes to teacher tenure because 
of the passage of House Bill 278 in 2014, and a full report on alternative 
tenure policies was due to the legislature on June 15, 2015. Although the 
results of this report have been delayed due to “some unexpected 
challenges related to the technical and original requirements of this 
project,”207 when it is released this report will surely be useful for the 
legislature to evaluate the impact of any changes on the tenure system, 
something the courts would not be able to do. 
One area of focus for the legislature should be changing the LIFO 
policies for layoffs. This is the one area of Alaska’s tenure system that 
basically mirrors California’s unconstitutional statute. Rather than 
laying off the teachers with the least seniority before teachers with 
tenure, the legislature should instead allow districts to consider teacher 
effectiveness in making layoff determinations. 
Other areas that the legislature could focus on, with the goal in 
mind of improving student outcomes, include attracting and retaining 
teachers in rural areas, supporting and evaluating new teachers, and 
building a teacher pipeline in Alaska so that the state is not so 
dependent on attracting teachers from outside the state. 
Ultimately, public education is a tricky area for courts to wade into. 
Researchers do not have definite answers on what policies lead to the 
best student outcomes. Courts that have gotten involved in school 
financing issues often find themselves bogged down for years in 
determining whether their lofty goals have been met. State legislatures 
are in a much better position to evaluate and determine which policies 
will work best in their state. Accordingly, potential challengers to 
Alaska’s tenure statutes may be better served by trying to change policy 
through the legislature, rather than through the courts. 
 
 207. Salary and Benefits Schedule for School Districts, PERSONNEL AND LABOR 
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CONCLUSION 
A copycat challenge to Alaska’s tenure system would have to 
overcome significant hurdles to have any chance of success. Unlike 
California, Alaska does not currently have jurisprudence that has 
declared education to be a fundamental right for equal protection 
purposes. Without that, it would be harder for the tenure system to be 
analyzed under strict scrutiny, and more likely that the system would 
survive a legal challenge. 
Additionally, Alaska’s tenure system differs from that of California 
in a few key respects. Alaska’s teachers are granted tenure after three 
years of teaching, not less than two years as in California, which falls in 
line with what the majority of other states do. While California teachers 
are protected from dismissal by “uber due process,” in Alaska, teachers 
are protected at the minimal due process level allowable by law.   
The one area where Alaska’s and California’s laws are essentially 
identical is in their “last-in, first-out” policy that does not allow 
administrators to consider a teacher’s ability and effectiveness in 
deciding who should be laid off. The Alaska legislature should consider 
changing this policy to align the state with how most other states govern 
teacher layoffs. 
Because of the difficulties a court challenge would face, a better 
route to change the teacher tenure system of Alaska would be through 
the legislature. 
